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Abstract 
This paper considers  the issue  of converging or  diverging growth  paths in  a long-run 
perspective.  In  particular, available  data are explored in order to investigate  whether or not 
the convergence  trend observed  since  the ending  of the Second  World War also  holds  for earlier 
time  periods.  The data are  used  to  illustrate  some  theoretical  insights  on the question  as  to 
what determines  convergence  or divergence  trends. A  brief historical interpretation of  the 
results  is  presented. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  issue  of what  are  the  sources  of long-run  growth  is  an  important  one,  as it 
has  a  crucial  impact  on  man’s  well-being.  Long-run  growth  has  a  clear  relative 
dimension:  whether  a particular  growth  regime  is characterized  as ‘high-growth’  or 
‘low-growth’  depends  both  on  the  history  of the  country  in  question,  and  on  the 
growth  pattern  observed  in  other  countries.  While  this  in  itself  is  clearly  a  trivial 
statement,  it  does  highlight  the  importance  of one  aspect  of growth  that  has  caught 
much  attention  in  recent  literature:  the issue of converging  or diverging  growth  paths. 
It  is  by  now  fairly  well  established  that  at  least  parts  of  the  world  have  been 
converging  in  terms  of per  capita  income since the ending of the  Second  World  War 
(see  for  example  Maddison,  1991a;  Abramovitz,  1992).  This  statement,  however, 
contains  two important  reservations:  it  only  holds  for  parts  of the  world,  and  for  the 
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postwar  period.  The  aim of  the  current  paper  is twofold.  First,  it  aims to  explore 
some of  the  available  data  in  order  to  investigate  whether  or  not  the  convergence 
trend  also holds for  earlier time  periods. Second, the data  will  be used to  illustrate 
sorne theoretical  insights into  the question of what  determines these convergence or 
divergence trends. 
The approach used  is nainly  quantitative,  with  much emphasis  on empirical results, 
and only  a brief  historical  and institutional  interpretation  will  be offered in  the last 
section. It  will  therefore  necessarily be disappointing  for  scholars who  are used to 
dealing  with  economic  problems  in  the  broad  historical  or  institutional  sense. 
However,  it  is hoped that  this paper will  be able to  isolate some interesting  views 
on the issue of  long-run  convergence and divergence  in growth,  which  can then be 
subjected to  further  historical  research. 
The rest of  this paper is organized  as follows.  Section  2 will  present and apply  a 
method  outlining  the  key  diverging  or  converging  trends in  long-run  growth.  The 
method will  be applied 1.0  several groups of countries, including  the group  that  now 
forms  the  OECD,  and  Latin  America.  A  first  attempt  (in  the  form  of  variance 
decomposition) to  isolate some of the factors explaining  the observed trends will also 
be  presented. Section  ? will  present some further  factors  explaining  the  patterns 
observed in Section 2. A  discussion  on the role of some of the most important  factors 
will  be given,  focusing also on  the  ways in  which  these factors can  (or  cannot)  be 
m(:asured. Some statistical analyses will  be applied to  test the  significance of  these 
factors in  various time  periods. This  statistical analysis cannot,  however,  provide  a 
cclmplete explanation  fcr  the convergence and divergence trends observed in Section 
2. Therefore,  Section 4  will provide  a brief  historical  perspective, trying  to  interpret 
the  results from  the  previous section. Section  5 will  summarize the  argument.  The 
sclurces  for  the data  used are outlined  in  an appendix. 
2.  Convergence and divergence in per capita income 
In  order to  measure convergence or divergence trends in per capita  income, a test 
proposed by  Ben-David  (1991) is applied.  This test assumes  the following  relation 
bztween per capita  income relative  to  some group  average in different  periods t and 
t  -  1. 
In  q=Yln  yW1  (1) 
1’is defined as (Q/P)/(XQ/CP),  and Q denotes GDP  (in  1980 US$ purchasing power 
parities), P denotes  population  (in thousands), and X  indicates the sum  in some  group 
of countries. The assumed  relationship  allows for  converging  (if Y  <  l),  diverging  (if 
Y’ >  l),  or  stable (if  ‘3’ =  1) differences in  per capita  income. 
In  order  to  estimate the  value  of  Y  for  different  periods of  time,  the  following 
procedure is used. For  each ‘case’ (defined as a combination  of countries, years, and 
reference group),  a pooled  cross-country  time  series  dataset is set up. In  turn,  ‘P is 
estimated by  OLS  for  the  subset for  periods t -  2 to  t +  2. This  means that  the 
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Fig.  1.  Local  convergence  and  divergence  in  Latin  America,  20th  Century.  -  Coefficient  -------  *  2 SE. 
in  the  analysis.  The  resulting  estimate  of  Y  is  attributed  to  t,  and  plotted  in  a graph 
together  with  the  estimates  for  other  periods.  The  estimated  coefficient  plus/minus 
two  times  the  estimated  standard  error  is  also  plotted,  so  that  a  (reasonably  wide) 
confidence  interval  is  established.  Whenever  this  confidence  interval  is  completely 
below  (above)  unity,  convergence  (divergence)  is  said  to  be observed.  Whenever  the 
confidence  interval  embraces  the  unit  line,  no  particular  trend  is  found. 
Convergence  might  be local  or  global.  For  example,  if the  average  distance  between 
Latin  America  and  the  OECD  countries  is  getting  smaller,  one  can  speak  of a global 
convergence  trend,  However,  if  Latin  American  countries  are  converging  towards 
some  Latin  American  mean,  local  convergence  is  taking  place. 
There  are  basically  two  sets  of  countries  for  which  long  enough  time  series  are 
available  in  order  to  apply  the  above  procedure.  These  are  the  six  Latin  American 
countries  in  Hofman  (1992)  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Venezuela) 
and  the  16  present  OECD  countries’  in  Maddision  (1991 a)  (Australia,  Austria, 
Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands, 
New  Zealand,  Norway.  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United  Kingdom,  United  States).  These 
data  are used  to  estimate  convergence  or  divergence  trends  for  three  different  groups: 
Latin  America,  Europe  (12  countries  in  Maddison),  and  the  OECD. 
For  Latin  America,  two  cases  are  examined:  local  convergence  towards  the  mean 
of  the  six  countries,  and  global  convergence  towards  the  mean  of  the  16  other 
countries.  The  results  of this  analysis  are in  Figs.  1 and  2. For  the  local  case,  a mixed 
pattern  is  observed.  In  most  cases,  the  solid  line  is  below  unity,  indicating  con- 
vergence.  However,  there  are  only  a  few  isolated  years  for  which  this  trend  is 
’  The  term  ‘OECD’  is  used  in  the  sense  of  describing  these  16  countries,  rather  than  the  present 
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significant.  This  indicates  that  although  there  is a weak  trend  for  local  convergence 
in  Latin  America,  the  growth  behaviour  of the  individual  countries  is so erratic  that 
the  overall  trend  is insignificant. 
For  the  case of global  convergence,  defined  as convergence  towards  the  mean  of 
the  OECD  countries,  a  different  picture  is  established.  Before  the  1940% the  trend 
was mainly  flat,  with  occasional  periods  of weak  convergence.  The  1940s show large 
swings,  but  from  the  1950s  onwards,  there  are  occasional  periods  of  significant 
divergence,  while  the  overall  trend  is one  of insignificant  divergence.  The  contrast  is 
sharpest  in  the  most  recent  period,  with  a  local  convergence  trend,  and  a  global 
divergence  trend. 
For  Europe,  the  picture  is  quite  different.  Figs  3 and  4 show the  local  and  global 
convergence  and  divergence  patterns,  respectively.  In  the  local  case, convergence 
prevails  over  the  total  period.  However,  significant  convergence  is only  found  in  the 
late  1930s and  the  postwar  period  (with  the  exception  of a brief  period  in  the  early 
1960s). A  similar  picture  is found  for  the  case of global  convergence,  except  that  in 
this  case the  1930s show a  somewhat  more  significant  convergence  trend.  In  both 
cases, convergence  seems to  slow down  in  the  1970s and  1980s. 
Fig.  5 gives the  results  for  the  16 OECD  countries.  This  is the  case where postwar 
convergence  is strongesi,  with  significant  convergence  up  to the  1970s. Also  the  1930s 
show weak  convergence.  The  slowdown  of  convergence  in  the  1970s and  1980s  is 
aiso  present  in  this  case, Finally,  Fig.  6 gives  the  trend  for  those  countries  for  which 
longer  time  series  (from  1860s  onwards)  are  available.  For  the  20th  Century,  the 
trend  for  these  countries  IS basically  the  same  as the  one  for  the  OECD  as a whole. 
The  40  years  in  the  19th  Century  show no  significant  trend,  with  the  exception  of a 
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Fig.  4.  Global  convergence  and  divergence  in  Europe,  20th  Century.  -  Coefficient  ---------  +2  SE. 
The  conclusion  from  these  pictures  is  that  convergence  is  strongest  in  the  total 
sample  of  OECD  countries  in  the  postwar  period.  The  Latin  American  countries  do 
not  seem  to  take  part  in  the  convergence  process  at  all.  However,  contrary  to  what 
other  authors  have  stressed  (for  example,  Abramovitz,  1992),  convergence  is  present 
in  the  immediate  pre-war  period  (i.e.  the  1930s)  too.  This  puts  the  argument  about 
the  influence  of  the  war  itself  in  a  different  light.  For  example,  Dollar  and  Wolff 
(1993,  pp.  445)  argue  : 148  B.  Verspagen/  Stmctural  Change  and  Economic  Dynamics  6  (1995)  143-165 
Time 
Fig.  5. Convergence  and  divergence  in  16  OECD  countries,  20th  Century.  -  Coefficient  _________ 
*SE. 
Fig.  6.  Convergence  and  divergence  in  11  OECD  countries,  20th  Century.  -  Coefficient  _________ 
*2  SE. 
“The  United  States  had  a  large  labor  productivity  advantage  over  all  other  countries  as the 
world  emerged  from  World  War  II.  This  advantage  was  partly  the  result  of the  destruction 
of the  capital  stock  in  13urope  and  Japan  during  the  war.  In  addition,  as  part  of the  war 
effort,  U.S.  industries  had  pioneered  a  wide  range  of  new  technologies  in  chemicals, 
aerospace,  electronics,  !md  other  sectors.  The  rapid  convergence  of  the  other  countries’ 
productivity  on  the  US.  level  in  the  1950s  partly  reflects  postwar  reconstruction  of the 
capital  stock.  Reconstruction  had  largely  been  completed  by the  end  of the  1950s;  however, 
it  can  be seen  that  convergence  on  the  United  States  continued,  though  at  a less rapid  pace.” B.  Verspagen/Structural  Change  and  Economic  Dynamics  6  (1995)  143-165  149 
The results  here  seem to  underline  the last  conclusion  by Dollar  and  Wolff,  stressing 
it,  however,  from  a  different  angle:  convergence  had  already  set  in  before  the  war, 
and  received  a  temporary  stimulus  through  the  effects  mentioned  by  Dollar  and 
Wolff,  but  after  that  continued  at  its  ‘natural’  pace. 
What  are  the  factors  leading  to  convergence  or  divergence,  and  why  is  their 
influence  so  different  in  different  periods?  A  first  attempt  to  establish  some  directions 
for  the  possible  answers  to  these  questions  can  be  found  by  applying  variance 
decomposition  methods  to  the  underlying  data  on  per  capita  GDP  in  the  above 
figures.  In  order  to  do  so,  one may  start  from  the observation  that  the current  dataset 
has  two  dimensions:  countries  and  time.  Then,  assume  that  the  growth  rate  of  per 
capita  income  (denoted  by  g)  can  be  described  by  the  following  function: 
go,  c)  =  p  +  a(t)  +  B(c)  +  y(t,  c)  (2) 
The  three  functions  r,  p,  y  denote  effects  related  to  time  (t),  country  (c)  and  an 
interaction  between  t and  c, respectively.  It  is  assumed  that  they  have  mean  zero  and 
variances  B,,  op and  o;,,  respectively.  This  implies  that  p  is  the  average  growth  rate. 
The  rest  of  the  analysis  in  this  section  will  attempt  to  give  an  explanation  of  the 
variance  of  the  observed  growth  rates,  by  decomposing  this  variance  into  the  three 
effects  related  to  time,  a(t),  country,  p(t),  and  the  interaction  term,  y(t,  c).  The 
technique  applied  to  do  this  is  described  in  Searle  (1971),  and  was  applied  to  the 
case  of  Chinese  economic  growth  by  Wang  and  Mody  (1993). 
First,  assume  that  the  covariances  between  the  different  effects  determining  g are 
zero.  Then,  the  variance  of  g can  be  found  as  follows: 
o(g)  =  tT, +  Gp +  cry  (3) 
Thus,  the  contribution  of  each  component  to  the  total  variance  of  growth  rates  can 
be  found  by  estimating  the  variances  on  the  rhs  of  this  equation.  The  approach  to 
do  this  is  to  calculate  a number  of  sums  of  squares,  the  expected  value  of  which  can 
be  expressed  as  a known  function  of  the  variances  to  be estimated.  These  variances 
can  then  be found  by  solving  the  related  equations,  substituting  the  expected  values 
of  the  sums  of  squares  by  the  observed  values. 
More  specifically,  calculate  the  following  sums  of  squares: 
T,  =  F  f  g(t.  c’?,  E(T,)  =  n&2  +  oa +  00 +  fTy)  (4) 
r=1  c=1 
(5) 
4 
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Table  1 
The  results  from  the  variance  decomposition  analysis. 
-  - 
Effect  All  countries  17  OECD  16  OECD  6  Latin  American 
(1900-1988)  countries  (1870-1988)  countries  (19CK-1988)  countries  (1900-1988) 
%  2  %  % 
-  - 
Time  5  Iti  18  14 
Country  2  0  5  1 
Interaction  93  84  77  85 
--  9  E(T,) = ntn,pz + ncu,  + ntn,aS  + n,cry  (7) 
n, 
The  expected  values  of  these  expressions  (denoted  by  E)  can  be confronted  with  the 
observed  values  in  the  sample,  after  which  the  values  for  the  variances  (and  P)  can 
be  solved  for.  The  expressions  that  result  from  this  procedure  are  the  following. 
To +  Tin,  -  T, n, -  T,  (Ta  =  -  ...._~~~  ~~ 
n,( 1 -  n,  -  n, +  n,n,) 
up =  - 
To +  T,n,  -  T,  -  T3 n, 
n,(l  -  n,  In,  +  n,n,) 
(9) 
uy = 
To +  T,  -  T2 --  T3 
1 -  n, -  n, i-  n,n, 
Table  1 shows  the  results  from  the  analysis  for  four  different  groups  of  countries. 
In  all cases,  most  of  the  variance  (from  75%  to  more  than  90%)  is  explained  by  the 
interaction  between  the  factors  time  and  country.  The  factor  time  also  explains 
a substantial  portion,  while  the  country-specific  factor  explains  little.  This  means  that 
in  this  sample,  growth  of  per  capita  income  is  not  specifically  strong  in  certain 
countries  nor  certain  time  periods.  Instead,  it  is  certain  countries  which  grow  fast 
(or  slow)  in  certain  periods.  Moreover,  there  are  no  big  differences  between  OECD 
and  Latin  American  countries.  However,  if  the  two  are  grouped  together,  the  impact 
of  the  time  factor  alone  diminishes,  while  the  variance  component  explained  by  the 
interaction  term  goes  up.  This  indicates  the  differences  in  growth  performance 
between  these  two  groups. 
The  conclusion  from  this  is  that  relatively  high  growth  does  not  seem  to  be  a 
persistent  phenomenon  in  this  sample.  If  one  is  going  to  try  to  explain  growth,  both 
time-  and  country-specific  factors  are  important,  but  they  should  not  be entered  into 
the  analysis  in  a  form  which  does  not  allow  any  interaction  between  the  two.  This 
conclusion  will  be the  starting  point  for  a more  elaborate  (regression)  analysis  in  the 
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3.  Suggested  explanatory  factors 
Economic  growth  is  a  complex  phenomenon.  This  paper  can  only  touch  upon 
some  of the  sources  of this  process,  which  as a whole  is clearly  beyond  the  scope  of 
a  single  contribution  of this  size.  However,  most  scholars  in  the  field  of  long-run 
growth  would  agree  that  technological  change  is  the  primary  force  driving  both 
long-run  economic  growth  itself,  and  differences  in  long-run  growth  between  nations 
and/or  time  periods  (some,  rather  randomly  chosen,  references from  various  fields  of 
economic  analysis  are  Schumpeter,  1939;  Nelson  and  Winter,  1982;  Romer,  1986; 
Maddison,  1991a). 
It  has also  often  been  recognized  that  technological  change  is a phenomenon  not 
easily  tackled  by  the traditional  tools  of the  economist  (see, for example,  the references 
in  the  previous  paragraph,  or  Dosi,  1988).  In  the  era  of  modern  capitalism, 
technological  change  is driven  by  economic  motives.  Research  and  development  is 
being  carried  out  in  large  laboratories  in  firms,  universities  and  (semi-public)  research 
institutes.  In  addition,  smaller  firms  also  invest  significantly  in  various  forms  of 
technological  change  (see for  example,  Kleinknecht,  1987). 
However,  the  main  thing  that  makes  innovation  so hard  to analyze  at the  aggregate 
level  usually  applied  in  studies  of economic  growth,  is  the  fact  that  its  impact  and 
the  way  in  which  it  is  established  varies  tremendously  from  case to  case. In  many 
cases, measuring  the  impact  of innovations  is  practically  impossible,  because  it  has 
an  influence  on  such  things  as the  quality  of life,  which  are  not  taken  into  account 
in  standard  national  accounting  practices  (think,  for  example,  of  improved  health 
care).  Sometimes,  the  impact  of an  innovation  can  be  quite  revolutionary,  although 
limited  to  a specific  field  of economic  activity  (think,  for example,  of the  many  patents 
issued  for  lawn-mowing  devices).  In  other  case, however,  an  innovation  (eventually) 
has an  influence  on  virtually  all  economic  activities  (recent  examples  are  computers 
and  new materials,  hisoric  examples  are electricity  or  the  automobile). 
What  all  these different  degrees  of impact  have  in  common,  however,  is  that  the 
influence  of an  innovation  only  takes  place  after  a significant  diffusion  lag.  Diffusion 
of  an  innovation  is  never  immediate,  and  always  depends  on  a  whole  range  of 
characteristics  of the  society  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  diffuse.  To  a certain  extent 
these  characteristics  are  economic  (firm  organization,  income  distribution,  etc.), but 
there  are certainly  institutional,  political,  geographical,  sociological  and  other  factors 
which  play  important  roles.  The  question  as to  why  the  industrial  revolution  took 
place  in  Britain,  for  example,  and  spread  to  other  countries  at  such  different  paces 
afterwards,  can  only  be answered  if these characteristics  of the  diffusion  process  are 
taken  into  account. 
All  of this  underlines  the  limited  use  that  can  be  made  of purely  economic  tools 
in  the  field  of  long  run  growth.  This  conclusion,  however,  should  not  lead  to  a 
nihilistic  methodology  in  which  these economic  tools  are thrown  overboard.  It  should 
rather  lead  the  economic  researcher  to  interpret  the  observed  trends  with  care,  and 
keep  in  mind  that  the  theory  developed  cannot  take  into  account,  let  alone  explain, 
every  aspect  of the  economic  history  of the  last  two  centuries. 
From  this  perspective,  what  are  the  economic  factors  related  to  technical  change 15::  B.  Verspagen/!:tructural  Change  and  Economic  Dynamics  6  (199.5)  143-165 
and  its  impact  on  long-run  growth?  One  important  factor  is  gross  fixed  capital 
formation  (investment).  Investment  is  related  to  technological  change  because  most 
innovations  rely  upon  embodiment  in  fixed  capital  for  their  influence  on  economic 
growth.  There  are  different  types  of  investment,  and  each  has  its  own  mode  through 
which  technology  is  fostered.  After  the  illuminating  contribution  by  De  Long  and 
Summers  (1991),  it  has  become  fashionable  to  stress  the  effects  of  investment  in 
machinery  and  equipment.  While  this  is  obviously  related  to  technological  change 
in  a  direct  way,  one  snould  not  underestimate  the  importance  of,  for  example, 
investment  in  infrastructure. 
There  is  an  important  problem  with  regard  to  the  measurement  of  capital. 
Economists  are  used  to  l.hinking  about  capital  as  a stock  of  goods.  While  this  notion 
is  appealing  from  an  intuitive  point  of  view,  it  also  introduces  many  problems  on 
the  measurement  side.  The  famous  debate  on  this  issue  between  the  two  Cambridges 
ofi  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  is  still  relevant  in  this  respect. 
Silverberg  (1991)  has  outlined  a  number  of  problems  of  this  type.  His  main 
objection  against  the  traditional  ways  of  measuring  concerns  the  assumptions  made 
about  life times  of  various  types  of  capital  goods  and  about  scrapping  of parts  of the 
capital  stock.  The  central  argument  is  that  scrapping  of  capital  goods  is  determined 
in  an endogenous  way,  and  strategies  related  to  scrapping  can  therefore  differ  between 
entrepreneurs.  For  example,  under  pressure  of  growing  real  wages  or  faster  tech- 
nological  competition,  capital  goods  might  be  scrapped  before  the  end  of  their 
technical  lifetime.  The  practices  used  by  the various  national  statistical  offices  (usually 
a fixed  lifetime  is  applied  to  a series  of  investment  data)  are  in  sharp  contrast  with 
this.  The  recent  efforts  (by  among  others  Maddison)  to  standardize  life  times,  and 
thus  capital  stock  estimates,  between  countries,  are  not  a  real  improvement  in  this 
respect  (see Wolff,  1994 for  an  application).  In  fact,  to  the extent  that  actual  economic 
life  times  differ  between  countries,  standardized  capital  stock  estimates  might  make 
the  problem  worse.’ 
Of  course,  investment  does  not  necessarily  imply  technological  change.  It  is  quite 
thinkable  that  entrepreneurs  invest  in  pure  capacity  expansion,  by  simply  buying 
more  of  the  old  equipment  they  already  used.  This  problem,  which  is  at  the  heart  of 
many  measurement  problems  discussed  above,  is  one  that  is  not  easy  to  tackle.  The 
central  issue  is  quite  well  described  in  a quotation  from  Lewis  (1978,  p.  116): 
“The  distinction  [between]  the functions  of capital  as  a factor  of production  and a bearer 
of new  technology  (.  .)  is  difficult  to  sustain  because the move  from  less  to  more  capital 
almost  always  involves  some  change  of  technology.  Yet  it  is  a  distinction  which  the 
econometricians  have decided to pursue,  and on which  they will  for  some time be continuing 
to break  their  heads. For  our  purposes  it  suffices  to note  that  in so far  as each generation 
of machines  is more productive  than its  predecessor,  a country  with  a high investment  ratio 
will,  other  things  being  equal,  have  higher  productivity  than  a  country  with  a  lower 
investment  ratio,  because  a  higher  proportion  of  its  machines  will  be  of  the  latest 
design.” 
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Economies  of scale  form  another  major  element  of technological  change.  In  the 
recent  so-called  new growth  theory  (see Verspagen,  1992  for  an  overview),  the  size 
of  the  population  (given  the  level  of  education)  is  a  main  factor  determining  the 
number  of innovations,  and  hence  productivity  growth.  In  a more  general  theoretical 
setting,  the  point  that  a  larger  production  scale  may  allow  for  the  introduction  of 
more  advanced  techniques  is  also  plausible.  The  ‘demand  pull’  argument  provided 
by  Schmookler  (1966)  can  be  seen  as  one  particular  application  of  this  insight. 
However,  the  classical  notion  of scale economies  applies  given  a certain  production 
technique.  This  indicates  that  certainly  not  all  scale  economies  are  related  to 
technological  change. 
One  particular  form  of scale economies  is related  to  specialization.  The  argument 
about  the  scale  economies  of  specialization  goes  back  at  least  to  Adam  Smith’s 
pin-factory,  where  the  division  of  labour  between  workers  created  important 
productivity  gains.  Later  on,  Kaldorian  theory  stressed  intertemporal  scale  econ- 
omies,  which  might  arise  from  specialization  due  to  learning  effects. In  this  theory, 
either  specialization  or  fast  growth  of  production  is  assumed  to  have  a  positive 
influence  on  the  opportunities  for  learning-by-doing  or  learning-by-using.  Models 
implementing  these  theoretical  insights  can  be  found  in  Dixon  and  Thirlwall  (1975) 
and  Verspagen  (1993).  The  body  of Kaldorian  theories  also  provides  an  important 
framework  for  so-called  export-based  theories  of growth. 
Even  within  the  economic  domain,  there  are  many  more  factors  with  an  influence 
on  technical  change.  The  development  of human  capital  and  schooling,  resources 
devoted  to  R&D,  or  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  from  research  institutes  or 
(foreign)  firms,  are  all  important  sources  for  productivity  growth.  However,  given 
the  historical  and  quantitative  viewpoint  in  this  paper,  many  of  these  factors  fall 
outside  the  current  scope,  either  because  their  role  only  recently  gained  importance 
(R&D),  or  because  historical  data  necessary  to  assess their  role  in  further  detail  are 
absent  (human  capital).  The  discussion  here  will  therefore  only  focus  on  one 
additional  factor,  related  to  the  international  dimension. 
Just  as the  impact  of an  innovation  on  the  national  level  can  only  be  established 
through  diffusion  in  the  national  economy,  the  impact  of  technical  change  on  the 
global  economy  can  only  occur  through  international  diffusion.  In  other  words, 
international  knowledge  spillovers  are an  important  source  for growth.  An  historical 
example  of the  importance  of international  diffusion  is the  case of the  spread  of the 
industrial  revolution  (see for  example  Lewis,  1978;  Kenwood  and  Lougheed,  1992). 
The  contribution  of Gerschenkron  (1962)  to  this literature  has inspired  many  scholars 
studying  postwar  growth,  leading  to  the  so-called  catching-up  literature  (for example 
Abramovitz,  1979;  Fagerberg  et al.,  1994). This  literature  has  focused  on  knowledge 
spillovers  as a major  source  for convergence  of per capita  GDP  in  the postwar  period. 
The  idea  in  this  literature  is that  relatively  backward  countries  will  be able  to  exploit 
a backlog  of knowledge  developed  in  the more  advanced  countries,  and  will  therefore 
grow faster. 
An  important  problem  that  seems central  to  most  of these factors,  however,  is the 
distinction  between  growth  due  to  growth  of  productivity,  or  growth  due  to  the 
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1957)  applied  by  the  ‘econometricians’  Lewis  is referring  to,  is  devoted  entirely  to 
distinguishing  between  the  contributions  of  the  growth  rate  of  inputs  and  other 
sources  to  the  growth  rate  of  output.  The  discussion  of  the  role  of  capital  in 
technological  change  above  has  shown  that  this  is  not  an  easy task.  If  an  increase 
in  the  stock  of capital  is observed,  which  part  can  be seen as ‘more  of the  same’,  and 
which  part  can  be  seen as enhancing  technological  change? 
The  neoclassical  concept  of  total  factor  productivity  (tfp),  which  is  the  central 
concept  in  the  so-called  growth  accounting  method,  has provided  an  elegant  answer 
to  this  question.  However,  this  answer, which  says that  the  growth  rate  of the  capital 
stock  should  be  weighted  by  the  share  of property  in  income  in  order  to  arrive  at 
its  contribution  to  output  growth,  relies  heavily  on  such  constructs  as equilibrium 
and  a competitive  market.  Keeping  this  in  mind,  the method  loses much  of its assumed 
general  nature. 
In  order  to  avoid  these  sorts  of  problems,  the  approach  chosen  here  will  be 
somewhat  different.  The  growth  accounting  approach  basically  assumes  that  the 
weights  that  give  the  growth  rate  of productivity  as a function  of the  growth  rates 
of certain  inputs  are  known.  These  weights  are  then  used  to  estimate  the  influence 
of these factors,  after  which  the  residual  growth  rate  is attributed  to  the  other  factors 
(like  technical  change).  Contrary  to  this,  the analysis  here  will  not  assume  any  known 
weights,  but  instead  will  attempt  to  estimate  these weights  by  means  of a regression 
analysis.  The  factors  not  directly  in  the  analysis  are  assumed  to  turn  up  in  the 
regression  constant  and,‘or  error-term. 
The  advantage  of this  approach  lies  in  its  more  general  nature.  Compared  with 
growth  accounting,  less restrictions  on  the  contribution  of certain  factors  are  made. 
Given  the nature  of the  assumptions  underlying  the  construction  of these restrictions, 
relieving  them  should  provide  the  analysis  with  an  additional  number  of degrees  of 
freedom  that  could  themselves  prove  quite  useful  for  explaining  long-run  growth. 
3.1.  Regression  analysis 
The  aim  of the  regression  analysis  applied  here  is  to  throw  some  more  light  on 
the  variance-decomposition  analysis  applied  above.  While  variance-decomposition 
is  more  or  less  a  black  box,  which  does  not  specify  the  nature  of  the  time-  and 
country-specific  factors,  regression  analysis  can do  this.  However,  because of the  long 
time  span  taken  into  account  in  this  paper,  many  variables  which  should  be included 
in  a  regression  explaining  growth,  cannot  be  taken  into  account,  because  of data 
limitations  (see the  discussion  above).  The  aim  of this  analysis  is  therefore  not  so 
much  to  estimate  a specific  growth  model,  but  rather  to  investigate  the  robustness 
of  some  (partial)  correlations  in  the  field  of long-run  growth  (see also  Wang  and 
Mody,  1993,  for  a justitication  for  such an  approach). 
The  following  variables  are used in  the  regression.  The  dependent  variable  is always 
the  average  annual  growth  rate  of per  capita  GDP  over  a certain  period.  The  periods 
used  are  1870-1880,  1880-1892,  1892-1900,  1900.-1914,  1918-1929,  1929-1939, 
1950-1960,  1960-1973.  1973-1988.  These  periods  are  chosen  on  the  basis  of  an 
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the  breakpoints  relate  to  breaks  in  this  series  (except  the  break  in  1960,  which  is 
made  to  take  into  account  the  building  up  of the  European  and  Japanese  economies 
after  the  war). 
Independent  variables  are the  investment  output  ratio  (defined  as the  mean  of the 
annual  values  in  the  period),  the export  to  output  ratio  (defined  similarly)3,  the  initial 
(i.e. first  year)  value  of per capita  income,  the  initial  size of the  country  (in  thousands 
of population),  and  a constant.  All  variables  are taken  in  natural  logs,  except  for  the 
dependent  variable  (which  might  take  on  negative  values).  The  investment-output 
ratio  is  entered  into  the  regression  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  effects related 
to  capital  investment  discussed  above.  The  export-output  ratio  and  the  initial 
population  size are  assumed  to  measure  the  effects related  to  the  various  forms  of 
economies  of scale, also  introduced  above.  The  initial  per  capita  GDP  is assumed  to 
take  into  account  the  effect of knowledge  spillovers. 
In  order  to  allow  for  the  interaction  between  time-  and  country-effects,  the  sample 
is  split  up  into  different  periods,  for  which  separate  coefficients  are  estimated.  Two 
separate  models  are estimated.  The  first  model  is a simple  linear  equation,  estimated 
for  a pooled  sample  of all  the  OECD  countries.  4 This  model  assumes  that  regression 
coefficients  do  not  change  over  time,  and  serves as a reference  for  the  second  model. 
The  second  model  has  the  following  form. 
5 
Sir  =  C  Caj  +  %jr  +  aji)xijt  (11) 
j=  1 
X  stands  for  the  five  variables  introduced  above.  The  subscripts  i, j  and  t  denote  a 
country,  a  variable  and  a  time  period,  respectively.  The  tls  are  separate  effects, 
associated  with  each  variable.  It  is assumed  that  aij  is equal  for  all  OECD  countries 
and  for  all  Latin  American  countries,  but  may  differ  between  these groups.5  In  order 
not  to  reduce  the  number  of degrees  of freedom  too  much,  the  sample  has been  split 
into  three  different  time  periods  for  which  cltj is  estimated:  1870-1929,  1929-1939 
and  1950-1988.6  This  periodization  is  not  only  intuitive  from  the  point  of view of 
economic  history,  it  also  links  up  closely  to  the  results  of the  descriptive  analysis  in 
the previous  section,  All  the  signs (i.e. aj  +  aij  +  cljt) are expected  to be positive,  except 
for  the  initial  per  capita  income,  which  has  an  expected  negative  sign,  and  the 
constant,  which  might  take  on  any  sign. 
3 For  the  Latin  American  countries  in  the  analysis,  yearly  export  data  are  absent.  The  solution  to  this 
is  to  use  the  values  of  the  export  to  GDP  ratio  for  1900  and  1913;  1913  and  1929;  1929,  1932  and  1938; 
1950;  1973;  1973,  1980,  1986  for  the  periods  1900-1914,  1918-1929,  192991939,  1950-1960,  1960-1973 
and  1973-1988,  respectively. 
4 The  OECD  countries  for  which  data  are  available  for  all  variables  are  Australia,  Canada,  France, 
Germany,  Japan,  Netherlands,  UK,  USA,  Sweden,  Italy. 
5 Venezuela  is  not  in  the  regressions,  because  export  data  are  absent  for  this  country. 
6 This  periodization  links  up  closely  to  Kenwood  and  Lougheed  (1992)  and  Maddison  (1991a),  for 
example.  The  main  difference  is  that  usually  the  interwar  is  taken  as  one  period.  Regressions  carried  out 
under  this  alternative  yield  slightly  worse  results.  These  regressions  are  not  documented,  but  available 
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Table  2 
Regression  results  for  explaining  growth  of  per  capita  income,  nine  time  periods  1871-1988,16  countriesa 
- 
In\  estment-  Export-  Initial  per  Initial  Constant 
onput  ratio  output  r.rtio  capita  GDP  population 
Eq  1,  pooled  OECD  sample  (  73  observations,  ag7.  RZ  =  0.37) 
0.0278  (4.91)  0.0089  (2.84)  -0.0164  (3.61)  0.0085  (4.01) 
Eq.  2,  OECD  and  Latin  Americcl,  3  periods  (103  observations,  adj.  RZ  =  0.62) 
1870-l  929-OECD 
0.0  I62  (3.74)  0.0084  (2.70)  -0.0163  (3.73)  0.0034  (1.88) 
19(0-1929-Latin  America 
O.OlMO  (0.59)  0.0032  (0.65)  -0.0179  (4.61)  -0.0055  (2.41) 
19;‘9-1939-OECD 
0.0  122  (2.03)  0.0075  (1.70)  -0.0257  (6.33)  0.0070  (2.23) 
19”9-1939-Latin  /  America 
0.0~)00  (0.00)  0.0023  (0.35)  -  0.0274  (6.06)  -0.0019  (0.58) 
19.‘,0-1988-OECD 
0.0234  (2.53)  0.0028  (0.86)  -0.0288  (7.37)  0.0088  (4.64) 
19.LmO-1988-Latin  America 
0.1  12  (0.98)  -0.0023  (0.38)  -0.0305  (5.74)  o.oooo  (0.01) 
0.0245  (1.77) 
0.0443  (2.93) 
0.0744  (3.23) 
0.0085  (0.34) 
0.0386  (1.38) 
0.0278  (1.51) 
0.0579  (1.94) 
’  Numbers  listed  in  the  cells  are  the  sum  of  G( values  for  the  indicated  categories.  Numbers  in  parentheses 
are  c-statistics,  Standard  errors  are  computed  from  a  matrix  corrected  for  heteroscedasticity. 
Table  2 shows  the  results  for  the  two  different  estimations.  Given  the  large  time 
span  involved  in the  firs  regression,  the  results  are  quite  reasonable.  The  proportion 
of  the  variance  explained  is  reasonable  (0.37),  and  all the  coefficients  are  significant 
and  have  the  expected  sign.  This  indicates  that  the  factors  in  the  regression  are  quite 
robust  factors  explaining  international  growth  rate  differentials  over  time. 
However,  given  the  fast  developments  of  the  20th  Century,  and  the  results  from 
the  variance  decomposition  analysis,  the  assumption  of  constant  coefficients  seems 
somewhat  too  restricting.  This  is  why  the  second  equation  estimated  allows  for 
different  coefficients  on  each  of  the  variables  in  different  time  spans.  In  general, 
splitting  up  the  sample  increases  the  goodness  of  lit  drastically,  and  brings  the 
proportion  of  the  variance  explained  up  to  0.62.  For  the  OECD  countries,  all  the 
coefficients  have  the  expected  sign,  and  most  are  also  significant,  at  least  at  the  10% 
level.  The  only  coefficients  which  are  clearly  not  significant  are  the  constants  in  the 
1930s  and  the  postwar  period,  and  the  coefficient  on  the  exporttoutput  ratio  in  the 
last  period.  This  is  quite  different  for  the  Latin-American  countries.  The  only 
coefficients  that  are  signiftcant  for  this  group,  are  the  catching-up  coefficients  and 
the  constants  (the  latter  with  the  exception  of  the  1930s).  The  only  conclusion  that 
can  be justified  on  the  basts  of  these  results  is  that  the  approach  used  does  not  have 
much  to  say  on  growth  in  Latin  America. 
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there  are  some  interesting  conclusions  in  the  OECD  sample.  The  impact  of  the 
investmenttoutput  ratio  is  relatively  high  in  the  postwar  period,  when  investment- 
output  ratios  increased.  The  impact  of  exports  on  growth  is  strongest  in  the  early 
periods,  and  turns  insignificant  in  the  postwar  period.  The  catching-up  effect  related 
to  initial  per  capita  income  is  significant  in  all  periods,  but  increases  in  magnitude 
in  the  1930s  and  the  postwar  period.  The  same  increase  is  found  for  the  case  of  scale 
economies,  as  indicated  by  the  population  size  variable.7  Finally,  the  constant  is 
relatively  high  in  the  early  period.8  For  the  Latin  American  countries,  it  does  not 
seem  very  useful  to  look  for  differences  in  the  magnitude  of  coefficients  between  time 
periods. 
In  what  respect  can  these  results  throw  any  light  on  the  issue  of  the  postwar 
convergence  boom?  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  assume  two  hypothetical 
countries.  The  first  of  these  countries  has  the  highest  value  of  per  capita  income  in 
the  period  under  consideration.  The  value  for  the  rest  of  the  variables  in  this  country 
is  equal  to  those  in  the  second  country.  The  second  country  has  a value  for  per  capita 
income  equal  to  the maximum  value  minus  one sample  standard  deviation.  Obviously, 
the  second  country  will  grow  faster  than  the  first  (due  to  the  negative  coefficient  on 
per  capita  income),  implying  convergence. 
Now  for  each  variable,  ask  the  question  by  how  many  sample  standard  deviations 
the  value  in  the  second  country  should  be  decreased  to  achieve  equal  growth  rates 
in the two  countries.  If this  value  is high,  this  means  convergence  is  achieved  relatively 
easily,  because  the  backward  country  might  have  low  values  for  the  other  variables 
than  per  capita  income,  and  still  be  catching-up.  The  contrary  holds  for  a low  value 
of  the  computed  number  of  standard  deviations.  Obviously,  this  value  depends  on 
the  sample  averages  of  all  the  variables,  their  standard  deviations,  as  well  as  the 
estimated  values  of  the  coefficients  in  Table  2. 
The  results  for  the  calculation  for  the  OECD  sample  are  presented  in  Table  3.9 In 
general,  it  is  seen  that  in the  periods  before  the  1930s  the  values  are  low,  but  slightly 
increasing.  This  indicates  the  low,  but  increasing,  potential  for  convergence  in  the 
sample  for  the  early  years.  In  the  1930s  corresponding  with  the  first  period  of 
convergence  found  in  the  previous  section,  the  values  rise.  In  the  postwar  period,  the 
values  are  decreasing  slowly  again,  and  become  quite  low  in  the  last  period.  This 
also  corresponds  with  the  evidence  in  the  previous  section. 
’  The  combination  of  the  results  for  the  export-output  ratio  and  the  initial  population  size  indicates 
that  there  might  be  some  multi-collinearity  between  those  two  variables.  In  fact,  the  (negative)  cor- 
relation  between  those  two  variables  is  quite  well  established  both  on  theoretical  and  definitional 
grounds. 
s Note  that  due  to  the  logarithmic  form  of  the  variables,  some  of  them  have  negative  values,  which 
makes  the  constant  difficult  to  interpret. 
9 Note  that  some  of  the  effects  documented  in  Table  3  are  dependent  upon  coefficients  from  Table  2 
that  are  not  statistically  significant.  For  example,  the  effects  related  to  the  export-output  ratio  in  the  last 
three  periods  are  in  some  cases  rather  large  (e.g.  195OC1960).  but  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  a 
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Table  3 
Catching-up  opportunities  offered  by  different  variables,  OECD  sample, 
1870-1988”. 
Period 
1870-1880  0.79  1.17  1.28 
1880-1892  0.87  1.28  1.53 
1892-1900  1.21  0.99  2.01 
19Oc-1914  1.23  1.10  1.96 
1918-1929  1.10  1.12  1.86 
1929-1939  3.12  1.75  1.27 
1950-1960  1.83  6.50  1.38 
1960-1973  1.12  4.76  0.91 
1973-1988  0.94  2.13  0.44 
Investment-output 
ratio 
Export-output  Initial 
ratio  population 
a A  low  (high)  absolute  value  indicates  a  relatively  low  (high)  opportunity  for 
catching-up  by  means  of  this  variable. 
4.  A  brief  historical  interpretation  of  the  results 
In a sense,  the regression  results  are  much  more  interesting  because  of the  questions 
they  raise,  than  the answers  they  provide.  As  the  discussion  of these  results  has  shown, 
the  regressions  provide  an interpretation  of the  postwar  convergence  boom  by  means 
of  the magnitude  of the parameters  estimated,  which  differs  between  pre-  and  postwar 
periods.  The  recent  convergence  slowdown,  on  the  contrary,  seems  to  be  due  to  a 
smaller  standard  deviation  of  per  capita  incomes,  or,  in  more  prosaic  terms,  a 
depletion  of  imitation  possibilities. 
‘The  real  question  that  comes  out  of  this,  is  why  the  estimated  coefficients  in 
the  regression  equation  would  differ  between  pre-  and  postwar  periods.  This  is  the 
question  that  this  section  will,  albeit  briefly,  address.  A  useful  starting  point  is  the 
distinction  of  different  periods  in  economic  growth.  Kenwood  and  Lougheed 
(1992)  distinguish  three  different  periods:  1820-1913,  1918-1939,  after  1945.  These 
periods  correspond  closely  to  Maddison’s  phases  of growth:  1870-1913,  1920-1939, 
1950-1973,  after  1973. They  also  correspond  quite  nicely,  although  not  completely, 
with  the  periodization  used  in  the  regressions. 
.4  review  of  some  indicators  for  these  three  (or  four)  different  periods,  will  yield 
some  interesting  features.  A  more  complete  discussion  than  is  possible  here  is 
provided  by  among  others  Lewis  (1978),  Maddison  (1991a),  and  Kenwood  and 
Lougheed  (1992).  The  main  focus  in this  section  will  be at the  sectoral  level,  discussing 
some  of  the  available  material  on  structural  change  and  international  trade. 
From  the  perspective  of  structural  change,  the  first  period  (before  1913)  was 
characterized  by  the  spread  of  manufacturing  technology.  The  industrial  revolution, 
taking  part  in  the  18th  Century  in  Britain,  transformed  the  UK  economy  during  the 
19th  Century,  but  only  k’egan  to  spread  in a significant  way  to  other  countries  in  the 
period  around  1870. B.  Verspagen/Structural  Change  and  Economic  Dynamics  6  (1995)  143-165  159 
At  the  same  time,  the  period  1870-1913  was the  period  in  which  the  USA  began 
to  overtake  the  UK  as the  technological  leader  in  the  world.  Among  the  factors  that 
are generally  mentioned  as the  causes for this  process of overtaking,  one  finds  the low 
investment  rate  in  Britain,  and  the  generally  poor  ability  of the  British  to  apply  new 
technologies.  In  a sense, as is argued  in  for  example  von  Tunzelmann  (1994),  this  is 
paradoxical,  because  many  of  the  new  technologies  (cars,  steel,  chemicals)  were 
actually  developed  in  Europe,  including  the  UK.  In  the  USA,  however,  the 
introduction  of the  new technologies  was coupled  with  new organizational  designs, 
such  as Fordism,  which  appeared  to  be  hard  to  implement  in  Europe.  The  USA  is 
generally  seen  to  have  had  some  inherent  advantages  (such  as  a  large  domestic 
population  and  a society  which  was perceptive  to  change)  that  favoured  this  process. 
Lewis  (1978)  provides  a nice  overview  of the  arguments  from  the  UK  point  of view, 
while  Abramovitz  (1994)  focuses  on  the  American  side.  (Also,  see the  article  by 
Broadberry  in  this  volume). 
From  the  perspective  of technological  and  structural  change,  the  period  after  1913 
had  a much  less radical  character.  The  spread  of the  industrial  revolution  within  the 
sample  of the  core European  countries  and  the  USA  had  more  or less been completed 
by  1913.  This  is  indicated  by  Table  4,  which  gives  the  share  of manufacturing  in 
GDP  for  selected  years.  Although  the  quality  of  the  data  for  the  early  years  is 
generally  poor,  the  table  indicates  that  the  share  of manufacturing  in  total  GDP  had 
Table  4 
The  spread  of  industrialization  in  selected  countries.  Share  of  manufacturing  in  GDP. 
1899”  1913”  1929”  1937”  1950”  1955”  1957”  1963b  1973b  1980b  1986b 
Argentina  0.14  0.15  0.18  0.20  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.44  0.50  0.40  0.48 
Australia  0.16  0.15  0.20  0.20  0.24  0.25  0.27  0.26  0.20 
Belgium  0.36  0.33  0.43  0.39  0.31  0.35  0.35  0.25  0.28  0.26 
Brazil  0.16  0.20  0.21  0.20  0.33  0.32  0.30 
Canada  0.22  0.19  0.26  0.28  0.29  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.21  0.21 
Chile  0.18  0.13  0.17  0.22  0.24  0.27  0.44  0.23 
Colombia  0.06  0.09  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.19  0.21  0.21  0.19 
Germany’  0.23  0.32  0.33  0.35  0.34  0.41  0.42  0.48  0.49  0.37  0.42 
France  0.28  0.41  0.35  0.35  0.27  0.29  0.32  0.34  0.34  0.27 
UK  0.19  0.20  0.25  0.28  0.35  0.37  0.36  0.40  0.42  0.32  0.31 
Italy  0.21  0.29  0.31  0.34  0.28  0.32  0.33  0.26  0.22  0.16 
Japan  0.16  0.13  0.17  0.21  0.15  0.24  0.29  0.35  0.42  0.33  0.34 
Mexico  0.17  0.23  0.24  0.26  0.22  0.22  0.21 
Netherlands  0.21  0.27  0.24  0.21  0.3 1  0.31  0.21  0.25  0.18 
Norway  0.20  0.25  0.21  0.21  0.25  0.28  0.28  0.24  0.26  0.15  0.14 
Sweden  0.27  0.34  0.30  0.35  0.36  0.35  0.35  0.28  0.33  0.26  0.27 
USA  0.22  0.25  0.28  0.28  0.31  0.32  0.32  0.30  0.33  0.29  0.3  1 
a Source:  Maizels  (1963,  Table  El  and  Table  E3). 
b Source:  own  calculations  on  the  basis  of  UNIDO  data  and  the  sources  for  GDP  mentioned  in  the 
appendix.  The  values  for  Argentina  seem  suffer  from  a  systematic  upward  bias. 
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Table  5 
Structural  change  in  international  trade  over  the  20th  Century.  Share  of  commodity  classes  in  total 
tradea. 
Commmodity  class  1899”  1913b  1929b  1937b  1950b  1955b  1957”  1970’  1980”  1990’ 
Subtotal  Metals  and  0.16  0.21  0.25  0.31  0.35  0.40  0.42  0.52  0.51  0.55 
Engineering 
Metals  0.116  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.21  0.21  0.26 
Machinery  0.1)4  0.06  0.09  0.10  0.14  0.15  0.17  0.10  0.08  0.05 
Transport  equipment  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.16  0.15  0.18 
Other  metal  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.06 
commodities 
Cklemicals  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.13  0.16  0.14 
Textiles  and  clothing  0.21  0.19  0.16  0.13  0.11  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.05 
Other  manufacturing  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.10  0.10 
Non  manufacturing  0.18  0.44  0.40  0.38  0.36  0.32  0.31  0.18  0.19  0.15 
Tcltal  manufacturing  0.52  0.56  0.60  0.62  0.64  0.68  0.69  0.82  0.81  0.85 
a 1  otal  trade  is  defined  as  e <ports  from  Belgium  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands  (not  in  1899). 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  UK,  Canada,  USA,  Japan).  Foodstuffs  are  excluded  from  manufacturing  trade. 
’  Source:  Maizels  (1963,  Table  E4). 
’  Source:  own  calculations  or  the  basis  of  OECD  data. 
reached  levels  in  1913  I hat,  for  most  countries,  were  more  or  less  comparable  with 
the  levels  that  would  be  attained  in  the  postwar  period.  The  UK  and  Japan,  as  the 
prototypes  of  early  and  late  industrializers  (respectively),  form  an  exception  to  this 
rule.  Both  countries  have  increased  the  share  of  manufacturing  in  GDP  significantly 
after  1913.  The  table  also  shows  the  decreasing  importance  of  manufacturing  after 
1973. 
The  most  important  characteristic  of  the  interwar  period  is  without  doubt  the 
generally  low  level  of activity.  Obviously,  this  is  best  illustrated  with  reference  to  the 
193Os,  in  which  the  Great  Depression  hit  economic  activity  almost  worldwide. 
However,  the  1920s  were  also  characterized  by  low  growth  and  utilization  of 
productive  capacities  (see  Maddison,  1991a). 
The  interwar  years  are  also  characterized  by  significant  structural  change  within 
manufacturing,  for  exemple  in  the  area  of  international  trade.  These  structural 
changes  were  largely  induced  by  the  changing  nature  of  manufacturing  production 
under  the  influence  of  innovations  that  played  a major  role  in  the  emergence  of  the 
USA  as  a  technological  leader.  The  old  commodities  (like  textiles  and  coal)  that 
characterized  the  early  stages  of  industrialization,  had  to  give  way  to  new  com- 
m.odities,  such  as  chemicals  and  new  types  of  machinery.  This  process  is  illustrated 
in  Table  5. 
The  table  shows  the  gradual  shift  towards  a  larger  share  of  metal  commodities 
(machinery,  basic  metals,  transport  equipment)  and  chemicals  in  total  trade.  This 
causes  the total  share  0’  manufacturing  to  go up  significantly.  Within  manufacturing, 
the  rise  of  these  commodity  classes  is  largely  at  the  expense  of  textiles,  which  are B.  VerspageniStructural  Change  and  Economic  Dynamics  6  (1995)  143-165  161 
reduced  to  a  very  small  commodity  class  by  the  1990s.r”  In  general  the  picture  of 
structural  change  that  emerges  from  Table  5 seems  to  be  one  that  is  very  gradual, 
showing  also  that  structural  change  continues  into  the  postwar  period.  This  makes 
the  features  describe  less  likely  candidates  for  explaining  the  differences  in  con- 
vergence. 
The  postwar  period  is  one  in  which  growth  was  generally  high.  Partly,  this  is 
caused  by  high  investment.  The  level  of  investment  as  a fraction  of  GDP  showed  a 
major  shift  after  the  war.  For  some  countries,  the  catching-up  effect,  which  is  the 
central  element  of  the  discussion  here,  also  contributed  significantly  to  high  growth 
(see  the  regressions  in  the  previous  section).  The  period  after  1973,  however,  seems 
to  show  that  the  ‘golden  age’  of the  years  1950-1973  was  quite  exceptional,  because 
growth  slowed  down  considerably  during  this  period. 
Are  there  any  factors  that  come  out  of  this  general  interpretation  of  the  nature  of 
the  different  epochs  that  can  throw  any  light  on  the  question  why  the  catching-up 
effect  was  so  much  stronger  after  the  war?  Lewis  (1978)  has  suggested  that  the  period 
of low  growth  between  the  wars  interfered  with  the  spread  of  an  important  amount 
of  innovations  that  were  developed  in  the  leading  country,  the  USA,  during  that 
period.  In  the  words  of  Abramovitz  (1994)  ‘America’s  labor  productivity  lead  had 
widened  in  two  main  phases,  the  first  between  1870  and  1913,  the  second,  another 
large  step,  during  the  wartime  decade  of  the  Forties’,  an  intepretation  based  on  the 
data  developed  by  Maddison,  which  were  also  used  for  the  present  paper.  In  this 
interpretation,  the  potential  for  convergence  was  present  in  the  interwar  period,  but 
due  to  a number  of  factors  the  potential  was  not  realized.  In  terms  of  the  results  of 
the  previous  sections,  this  underlines  again  the  importance  of  the  question  why  the 
catching-up  coefficient  was  so  small  during  the  early  periods. 
Lewis  (1978)  does  not  go into  the  matter  in very  much  detail,  but  simply  underlines 
that  the exceptionally  low  capacity  utilization  led to  the  accumulation  of a backlog  of 
convergence  potential  which  remained  largely  unused.  In  a  more  general  inter- 
pretation,  his  argument  can  be taken  to  stress  that  catching-up  is  ‘easier’  in  periods 
of  high  growth,  than  in  periods  with  low  growth.  This  fits  the  results  found  in  this 
paper  quite  well,  with  a  weak  convergence  trend  in  the  1930s  strong  convergence 
during  the  golden  age of the  1950s  and  196Os, and  a slowdown  in convergence  during 
the  1970s. 
Abramovitz  (1994)  discusses  a  number  of  factors  that  might  give  a  deeper 
understanding.  First,  he  mentions  the  nature  of  the  technologies  available  for 
imitation,  after  the  US  took  over  leadership  from  Britain.  According  to  him,  their 
scale-intensive  nature  made  them  more  suitable  for  the  large  US  market.  Only  when 
European  markets  themselves  became  larger  after  the  war,  did  the  mass-production 
methods  become  suitable  for  these  smaller  economies.  Second,  he  mentions  factors 
related  to  ‘social  capability  to  catch  up’  (such  as  managerial  attitudes  and  education) 
which  were  generally  weak  in  Europe  during  the  interwar  years. 
Nelson  (1991)  focuses  on  some  peculiarities  of  the  postwar  period  in  order  to 
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explain  the  observed  differences.  He  stresses the  openness  of world  markets  after  the 
second  world  war  (as  related  to  some  well-known  developments  such  as  Bretton- 
Woods  and  increasing  mobility)  as  the  main  source  for  the  ‘loss  of  American 
leadership’,  This  immediately  offers  an  interpretation  for  the  slowdown  of  con- 
vergence  since the  mid-1970s.  While  the  oil  crisis  of 1973  is generally  seen as having 
an influence  on  growth  performance,  it  is not  clear  how it  should  have  an  immediate 
impact  on  convergence.  The  breaking  down  of the  Bretton-Woods  system,  however, 
seems to  be  related  to  this  in  a direct  way. 
On  the  basis  of the  results  in  the  previous  section,  the  explanations  related  to  the 
openness  of the world  economy  and  the  ‘social  capability  argument’  seem more  likely 
candidates  than  the  first  one.  If  scale  economies  were really  much  more  important 
in  the  pre-war  period,  this  would  probably  have  turned  up  in  the  coefficient  on 
population  size. But  what  the  regressions  show is that  scale economies  became  much 
more  important  in  the  1930s and  the  postwar  period,  which  is contrary  to  such  an 
expectation. 
5.  Summary  and conclusions 
This  paper  has focused  on  convergence  and  divergence  of per capita  income  levels 
over  the  19th  and  20th  Centuries.  In  the  second  section,  it  has  been  shown  that 
convergence  has been  taking  place  in  OECD  countries  in  the  post-war  period.  Earlier 
periods  and  other  countries  generally  led  to  the  conclusion  of more  or  less constant 
per  capita  income  differences,  or  in  some  cases (Latin  America)  divergence.  Using  a 
variance  decomposition  analysis,  it  was shown  that  in  general  there  is no  trend  for 
persistence  in  high  or  low growth  in  the  sample  considered.  Instead,  certain  countries 
grow rapidly  (slowly)  in  certain  time  periods. 
The  third  section  has  implemented  some  empirical  approaches  to  explaining 
growth.  A  regression  analysis  has  shown  that  for  OECD  countries,  investment- 
output  ratios,  export-output  ratios,  population  size  and  catching-up  potential  all 
had  a  significant  (positive)  influence  on  per  capita  income  growth.  Population  size, 
investment  and  the  catching-up  effect are  particularly  strong  in  the  postwar  period 
of high  growth.  For  Latin  America,  the  regression  approach  leads  to  worse  results. 
Section  4 has  attempted  to  provide  some  explanations  for  the  question  as to  why 
the  catching-up  potential  was so  much  larger  in  the  post-war  period.  Drawing  on 
previous  work  by Nelson,  Abramovitz  and  Lewis,  it  was concluded  that  factors  such 
as the  opening-up  of the  world  economy,  social  capability  to  catch  up,  and  the  low 
activity  in  the  interwar  years  are  related  to  this  trend. 
Appendix.  A  note on sources 
A.1.  GDP 
A.l.l.  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
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The  principal  source  is Maddison  (1991a).  The  data  in  Glissmann  et al.  (1981)  for 
Germany  (1850-  1860)  and  the  UK  (1830-l  860)  are  used to  interpolate  Maddison’s 
data  for  the  indicated  periods.  The  method  used  to  do  this  is  to  fit  the  trend  in  the 
data  of  Glissman  et  al.  (1981)  to  Maddison’s  series.  For  comparison  with  Latin 
America  and  Asia,  the  series obtained  this  way (which  were in  1985 US$  purchasing 
power  parities  (PPP)),  were  transformed  to  1980  US$  PPP  by  using  the  1980  and 
1985 PPP  indices  and  the GDP  price  indices  for those  years supplied  by the  OECD. 
A. 1.2.  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Venezuela. 
The  source  for  these  data  is  Hofman  (1992). 
A.2.  Population 
A.2.1.  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  UK,  USA. 
Population  data  for these  countries  are  taken  from  Maddison  (1991a).  Since  these 
data  are  not  adjusted  for  border  changes,  the  information  in  Maddison  (1991a, 
various  appendices)  was used  to  perform  such  a  correction.  For  Germany  and  the 
UK,  population  data  were interpolated  for  years that  GDP  was taken  from  Glissman 
et al. (1981)  (see above).  This  was done  by fitting  a third-order  polynomial  time  trend 
to  the  data  in  Maddison  (1991a)  for  these  years. 
A.2.2.  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Venezuela. 
The  source  for  these  data  is  Hofman  (1992). 
.4.3.  Investment 
A.3.1.  France,  Germany,  Netherlands,  United  Kindom,  Australia,  Canada,  USA, 
Japan. 
The  data  for  investment  and  GDP  used  to  calculate  the  investment-output  ratio 
are  taken  from  Maddison  (1991b). 
A.3.2.  Italy,  Sweden 
Investment  data  for  these  countries  are  taken  from  Glissman  et  al.  (1981).  These 
data  were transformed  to  1980 US$  PPP  by use of the  Maddison  data  on  PPP,  and 
divided  by  data  on  GDP  from  Maddison  (1991a). 
A.3.3.  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico,  Venezuela. 
The  source  for  these  data  is Hofman  (1992). 
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